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Soules: Indispensable Parties.

THE LAWYER'S FORUM
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
LUTHER H. SOULES II1*

Problems of fundamental error, particularly those of indispensable
parties, are as troublesome and perplexing as any that may occur in a
lawyer's practice. Failure to join persons who are indispensable to a
suit is fundamental error' and can be raised at any stage in the progress
of a case from the moment it is filed through and including its final
disposition in the Supreme Court of Texas. 2 The purpose of this article
is to suggest to Texas lawyers a usable formula for determining who
is an "indispensable party."
A

HINDSIGHT VIEW

The exemplary case of Mitchell v. Mitchell,3 a will construction
suit, was filed by the plaintiff in the trial court in 1949. After disposition in the lower courts, the case was appealed ultimately to the Su-

preme Court of Texas where a judgment was rendered on June 27,
1951.4 On July 12, 1951, in the first point of their motion for rehearing,
* Mr. Soules practices in the San Antonio law firm of Matthews, Nowlin, Macfarlane
8&Barrett.
1 "If [the absentee] were truly an indispensable party to the suit, we would agree
that the error in proceeding in his absence was fundamental error which could and
should have been noticed by the Court of Civil Appeals on its own motion." Petroleum
Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
2 McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265 (1957); Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947) concurring opinion; and cf. Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Sup. 1968). Because this article is concerned with
fundamental error, cases where pleas in abatement for misjoinder were timely filed have
been largely disregarded. A litigant is in a considerably better position when misjoinder
is discovered at an early stage in the proceedings so that a proper objection may be
timely filed. The criteria discussed in this article for identifying indispensable parties
can be applied at any stage in the development of a case, and the specter of fundamental
error due to misjoinder will be wholly avoided by a sufficient and timely plea. See
Royal Petroleum Corp. v. Dennis, 160 Tex. 392, 332 S.W.2d 313 (1960); and cf. Petroleum
Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, supra note I, at 894, "In Dennis we had no occasion to
determine whether the absent persons were indispensable parties; the defendants had
insisted by plea in abatement that the absent persons be joined, and we held that the
trial court properly sustained the plea."
3 This case was twice appealed through the Texas appellate courts; 235 S.W.2d 744
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1950, jdgmt rev'd); 151 Tex. 1, 244 S.W.2d 803 (1951); 298
S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, jdgmt mod'd); 157 Tex. 346, 303 S.W.2d
352 (1957).
4 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 151 Tex. 1, 244 S.W.2d 803 (1951).
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the respondents presented a new and independent contention never
before raised by any party to the suit. The respondents charged that
the courts had erred in exercising jurisdiction to construe the will of
Aurelia Mitchell because numerous beneficiaries under the will were
not made parties to the suit; because they were not represented by the
only class described in the suit; and because they were indispensable
persons in whose absence no court could proceed to judgment. More
than six months later the Supreme Court denied rehearing without a
written opinion. 5 Not until June 19, 1957, however, did it become
settled that in the absence of those persons the issues in the first appeal
had in fact been finally decided by the court construing the Mitchell
will. 6 Upon deciding the will construction issues presented on the first
appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for an
accounting. Before the trial court took up the remanded accounting
phase of the suit, the former absentees became parties and raised anew
the will construction issues which had been decided in the first appeal.
On the second appeal, rather than holding simply that the judgment
in the first appeal was res judicata,or that the first decision was the law
of the case, the Supreme Court dealt with the contentions of the former
absentees on their merits. The court held that the judgment in the
second appeal on the reasserted issues should be no different from the
judgment in the first appeal under the doctrine of stare

decisis.7

The

court held as follows:
When the Supreme Court once determines the true construction of a will or other written instrument that construction
is binding in all subsequent suits involving the same subject matter even though the parties in subsequent suits may not be the
same as in the original suit. No reason is perceived why that doctrine is not applicable in this proceeding. It is claimed that the
original suit was not an adversary proceeding in that necessary
parties were lacking in the case because the remainderman and
many of the life beneficiaries were not represented in that class
action. That contention was presented to this court in the former
appeal. ...

We overruled that motion and upon the authority of

that ruling the contention now presented is not sustained.

It is recognized, however, that the doctrine of stare decisis
does not absolutely bind this court to follow its prior decisions.
We have the power to overrule our decision in the former appeal
5 Id.
6 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 157 Tex. 346, 303 S.W.2d 352 (1957).
7Id.
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of this case and declare that the testatrix intended to constitute
royalties as income. We should exercise that power if convinced,
and only if convinced, that our prior decision was not sound and
that good reasons exist for overruling it, but we are not at all convinced that our prior construction of this will is erroneous. On
the contrary, we are of the opinion that it was sound, and we accordingly reaffirm it.8
It is important to note that the court conspicuously avoided treating
its earlier judgment as binding on the former absentees; rather it
held that the doctrine of stare decisis made the court's former holdings dispositive on the second appeal of the issues unless good reasons
existed for departure from those holdings.
Imagine the concern of those petitioners and lawyers who had won
a judgment in the first appeal to the Supreme Court when they became faced with a troublesome "parties" problem initially raised by
the respondents in their motion for rehearing. Their concern was
preserved through more than six years of subsequent litigation in
that suit. The Texas cases provide no usable guidelines for determining which persons have such an interest in the subject matter of a suit
that, in their absence, the courts are without power to proceed to
judgment.
A

PRESENT VIEW

The Supreme Court of Texas accepted an opportunity to write in
this complex area in July of last year when it granted the petitioner's
application for writ of error in the case of Snider v. Mason.9 That
opportunity, however, was never consummated because by agreement
of the parties the petitioner's application for writ of error was dismissed in October.' 0 The facts before the court in that cause presented
a text book example for analyzing complex parties problems.
The suit was brought by petitioner E. D. Snider, a judgment creditor, to avoid two deeds allegedly executed to defraud him. Based on
jury findings, the trial court rendered judgment for Snider. The Court
of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded, stating, "[i]t seems well
settled in this State that one who seeks to cancel a deed must have all
parties to the deed made parties in the suit before relief can be
granted." That holding required the joinder of James Mason, admin8 Id.

9 Snider v. Mason, 11 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 514 (1968).
10 Snider v. Mason, 12 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 58 (1968).
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istrator of the estate of the deceased Mrs. Rickard and Mr. Rickard,
as the grantors of the first disputed deed; James N. Phenix, C. A.
Keeling, and Bill Wilder, as the grantees of the first deed and grantors
of the second disputed deed; and James Mason, individually, and
Robert Mason, as grantees of the second deed. Although no party
raised any objection in the trial court or point of error upon appeal
asserting the failure to join other persons as parties to the action, the
Court of Civil Appeals held that "[s]uch parties are necessary parties
and a failure to join them in the suit is fundamental error of which
[it] must take notice."1 1
In 1964, during the pendency of a damage suit filed by Snider
against Don and Willie Mae Rickard, husband and wife, the Rickards
executed the first of the disputed deeds to their lawyers. That deed
purported to convey all of Mrs. Rickard's interests in eleven tracts of
land, her separate property, allegedly worth $5,000.00, to James N.
Phenix, C. A. Keeling, and Bill Wilder, partners in the law firm of
Phenix, Keeling, and Wilder. In 1965 after Snider had obtained a
$3,000.00 judgment against the Rickards in the damage suit, the other
disputed deed was executed by the lawyers individually to Mrs. Rickard's two brothers, James and Robert Mason. Corresponding with
the execution of the latter deed, the brothers executed a note to the
lawyers for $2,000.00 secured by a deed of trust lien on the interest
formerly owned by Mrs. Rickard in the eleven tracts. In his suit
Snider joined no parties other than the defendants James Mason,
individually and as administrator of Mrs. Rickard's estate, and Robert
Mason.
There was disputed testimony that at the time the first deed was
executed, Mrs. Rickard owed the lawyers $2,000.00 in attorneys' fees
for past legal services as well as for representing her in the damage suit
and that she owed her brothers in excess of $3,000.00 for money she
had borrowed from them. However, the jury refused to find that Mrs.
Rickard owed valid debts either to the lawyers or to her brothers;
rather it found that the deed from her to the lawyers and the deed
from them to her brothers were executed with intent to delay, hinder,
or defraud her creditors, and further that the lawyers as her grantees
knew or should have known of such intent on the part of Mrs. Rickard.
In support of the trial court's judgment, a finding was deemed that the
brothers knew of such intent on the part of either Mrs. Rickard or
11 Mason v. Snider, 425 S.W.2d 377, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ granted
and subsequently dism'd by agreement).
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the lawyers, or at least that they were in possession of facts sufficient
to put them on notice. Ordinarily those findings would require a judgment declaring the deeds void as to Snider. 12 But "[]urisdiction over
indispensable parties to a suit is as essential to the court's right and
power to proceed to judgment as is jurisdiction over the subject matter."' 8
If in the Snider case "indispensable parties" were absent from the
trial and appeal, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing
and remanding the cause to the trial court for proper joinder of the
absentees was correct. However, the statement by the Court of Civil
Appeals that all parties to a deed must be made parties to a suit before
relief cancelling that deed can be granted is erroneous and was recently expressly disavowed by the Supreme Court of Texas. 1 Nonetheless, indispensable persons whose joinder is required by Tex. R. Civ.
P. 39(a) must be made parties. "[P]ersons having a 'joint interest'
within the meaning of paragraph (a) [of Rule 39], properly interpreted,
are indispensable parties. . .. "15 A proper analysis of the parties problem in the Snider case depends entirely upon a determination whether
Messrs. Rickard, Phenix, Keeling, and Wilder 16are "persons having a
joint interest" within the meaning of the rule.
AMENDED FEDERAL RULE

19

The source of the Texas rule is FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) as enacted in
1937 and as it existed unchanged until it was completely rewritten in
the 1966 amendments. Prior to those amendments, it was suggested
that Rule 19(a) should be interpreted in light of earlier case law, and
factors are summarized which among others would be useful in determining persons who are indispensable parties in the federal practice. 17 The view of the Subcommittee on Interpretation of the Texas
12 TEx. REV.

CIV.

STAT. ANN.

art. 3996, which

reads as follows: "Every

gift, con-

veyance, assignment, or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate real or personal, every
suit commenced, or decree, judgment or execution suffered or obtained and every bond
or other writing given with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, purchasers,
or other persons of or from what they are, or may be, lawfully entitled to, shall, as
to such creditors, purchasers or other persons, their representatives or assigns, be void.
This article shall not affect the title of a purchaser, for valuable consideration, unless
it appear that he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of
the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor."
13 Petroleum Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
14 Id. at 894.
15 Id. at 893.
16 Tex. R. Civ. P. 39(a).
17 WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 70 (1963). See also 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 511, 512, and 516 (Wright ed. 1961); 3A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ch.
19 (2d ed. 1968).
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Rules18 was that Tex. R. Civ. P. 39a should likewise be interpreted
in light of previous practice.
In determining indispensable parties, the real problem is whether
the choice of parties by the litigants is to be overborne by the interests
of potential, but absent, parties and by the social interest in the orderly
and expeditious administration of justice. 19 Although the interest of an
absentee can never be legally affected when he is not a party to a suit
or represented therein, the fact that a judgment will not be technically
20
binding on him is not a controlling factor.
The label "indispensable" is used if the connection of the absentee
with the subject matter of the action is so close that a judgment entered
in his absence must be reversed because of his absence regardless of a
proper appellate predicate for the error in failing to join him. That
there should be such a classification of parties is sensible, but judicial
attempts to indicate when the label is legally appropriate have not
been entirely satisfactory. Neither is the particular language of the
rule helpful in this regard. "[T]he conceptual test of a 'joint interest'
is made the dividing line between proper parties, on the one hand,
and necessary or indispensable parties on the other, while once that
line has been crossed the rule offers no guidance in determining
whether a particular party with a 'joint interest' is indispensable or
merely necessary." 21 Recognizing the circular and therefore unhelpful
approach taken by some courts in holding that for purposes of determining party problems, the term "joint interest" means any interest
which under pre-rule practice constituted the owner of such interest a
necessary or indispensable party, Professor Wright summarizes factors
largely derived from antecedent case law in the following comment:
Modern scholarship has pointed the way to a more realistic
rule for classifying parties. On this view, a party would be either
necessary [insistable] or indispensable if in his absence complete
relief cannot be accorded to the existing parties, or if he has some
interest in the controversy and is so situated that disposition of
the action in his absence might as a practical matter impair his
188 Tex. B.J. 19 (1945).

192 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 511, at 91 (Wright ed.
1961); Reed, Compulsory joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 327, 330
(1957).
202 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 512, at 101 (Wright ed.
1961); cf. Petroleum Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
21 WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS (1963), § 71, at 261. Parties classed as "necessary" or "conditionally necessary" under the Federal terminology are "insistable parties" in the
terminology adopted in this state. Petroleum Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d
891 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
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ability to protect that interest, or if a judgment in his absence
would expose any of the existing parties to double obligation by
reason of his claimed interest. If the absentee falls in this class
and cannot be joined, the court would then decide whether to
proceed in his absence by a frankly discretionary weighing of
such factors as whether a satisfactory judgment could be rendered
in his absence, to what extent a judgment would as a practical
matter be prejudicial to him or to those already parties, what protective provisions in the decree might lessen or avoid such prejudice, and whether the plaintiff would have a satisfactory remedy
if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder of the absentee. There
is good reason to believe that this is what most courts already do
in practice, and that the time-honored labels are applied only
after such a determination has been made .... 22
The author suggested that these factors should be textually incorporated into Federal Rule 19.23 They were incorporated almost verbatim
in the 1966 amendments and the term "joint interest" was eliminated
24
from the text.
It is not necessary to amend Texas Rule 39 before the courts may
announce generally proper factors to be considered in determining
parties' classifications in this state. Criticism has been leveled at the
Federal Advisory Committee and its Reporter for undertaking textual
changes in the Federal Rule.
Revised Rule 19 was not born of need. With deference we
22 WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS

(1963), at 263.

23 Id.
R. Civ. P. 19(a) and (b) as amended 1966 which reads as follows:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (I) in this absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so
joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded
as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what
extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him
or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in
the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be
lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence
will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if
the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

24 FED.
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believe that the objective could have been obtained, and perhaps
better, if original Rule 19 had been left alone; the substance of
the revision combined with much of the Committee's Note [appended to the revised rule]; and this overall product promulgated
as the Committee's Note explaining what it conceived to be the
proper function of original Rule 19. Sound commentary can
greatly assist in the area of necessary [insistable] and indispensable
parties where the substantive rights and interests and the interrelationship of various persons are complex; federal jurisdictional
and related matters raise additional problems; and the need for
some adjudication as against no adjudication must be weighed. In
the end it comes down to good judging, and often in the setting of
complex facts, interests, and rights.
Having embarked on revising Rule 19, we believe that the
Committee produced a potentially good rule (albeit we think it
has some shortcomings), for the Rule is rather general in nature,
informative, and based upon factors and considerations drawn
from the wealth of experience revealed in the decided cases. And
if it is clearly borne in mind that the revised rule does not break
with the judicial tradition concerning necessary and indispensable
parties, that goes back to 1789, but is based upon that tradition
its general principles then much good may come of
and continues
25
the revision.
The factors which were suggested for interpreting and applying the
earlier Federal rule, and which were textually adopted in the 1966
amendments, provide a useful method for the interpretation and application of Texas Rule 39. If, after considering the suggested and
other relevant factors in a particular case, it is determined that joinder
of an absentee is so fundamentally necessary to the orderly and expeditious administration of justice that a judgment in his absence cannot
be appropriate, the trial or appellate court making that determination
must declare the absentee an indispensable party and disallow any
judgment on the merits to be rendered in his absence. A judgment
disposing of the case without the absentees would be fundamentally
erroneous. 28 It is now well settled that "when its jurisdiction is invoked by application for writ of error, the Supreme Court is authorized to and will consider fundamental error even though not assigned
by the parties.

' 27

253A MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 19.01-1[7], at 2125 (2d ed. 1968).
26 Petroleum Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
P7 McCauley v. Consolidated Underwritcrs, 157 Tcx. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265 (1957).
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If, on the other hand, after considering the factors, the court determines that the choice of parties by the litigants is not overborne
by the interests of potential but absent parties and by the social
interest in the orderly and expeditious administration of justice, the
absentee is assigned the status of at most an insistable party. While
it is axiomatic that failure to join indispensable parties is fundamental
error, failure to join an insistable party is reviewable on appeal only
28
when there exists a proper appellate predicate.
The severe consequences which may befall litigants who fail to join
indispensable parties demand that such classification of parties be
narrowly limited. It is conceivable that proceedings not involving
property within the jurisdiction of the court could be completely
stymied by an indispensable absentee who could not be brought into
court involuntarily.2 9 Seldom, of course, could this extreme event
occur. "There is no person so intimately related to matter in litigation
between others that there cannot be circumstances which will justify
proceeding in his absence."' 0 Before an action could be indefinitely
abated it would be necessary to show that the trial court has no legal
method to assert jurisdiction over the absentee; that in his absence
complete relief cannot be given between those already parties; that the
interest in the subject matter of the action claimed by him is such that
the disposition of the action in his absence will as a practical matter
impair his ability to protect that interest; and that the persons already
parties would be left subject to inconsistent judgments because of his
claimed interest. When these circumstances exist the court must further determine that in equity and good conscience the action could
not proceed among the parties before it. The court will consider
such factors as the extent to which a judgment rendered in his absence
will be prejudicial to the absentee; the extent to which a subsequent
suit by him could be prejudicial to those already parties; the extent to
which that prejudice can be lessened or avoided by the shaping of
relief in the judgment or by other measures; the extent to which a
judgment in the absence will be otherwise adequate for those already
parties; and whether those already parties will have an adequate remedy if the action is abated for nonjoinder of the absentee. Upon a
balancing of all of these factors a court may conclude that a judgment
28 Id.
29

See note 36 infra.

80 Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 327, 538

(1957).
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would be meaningless or that justice cannot be accomplished without
the absentee. When that is the case, the absentee is indispensable, and
the action must be abated until jurisdiction to bind him by the judgment is somehow attained.
This is not to say that the court lacks jurisdiction to enter a judgment on the subject matter which would be binding on those already
parties to the action. Joinder of indispensable parties is not a question
of jurisdiction; rather, it is a question primarily concerned with the
orderly and expeditious administration of justice.8 1 Although a widespread and common misconception has developed that failure to join
indispensable parties affects the jurisdiction of the trial court, principles to that effect developed around federal diversity jurisdiction
and are not elsewhere applicable. 2 "[T]here is no prescribed formula
for determining in every case whether a person or corporation is an
3
indispensable party or not."
TEXAS RULE

39

In Snider the lawyers as deed of trust lienholders, but not as parties
to the disputed deeds, are indispensable parties. Phenix and Wilder,
however, made themselves parties by their participation in and control
of the litigation and would be bound by the judgment setting aside
their grantors' title. No fundamental error was committed by the trial
court in failing to make them parties by name. The title which they
sought to defend was that of their clients, the Mason brothers, their
deed of trust grantors; and one of the deeds they sought to protect was
their own warranty deed to the brothers. Phenix testified at the trial
seeking to establish that the deeds had been executed for consideration
and without any intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of
Mrs. Rickard. The interest of Phenix and Wilder was in community
with that of the brothers, and their presence and the nature of their
participation was sufficient to bind them as parties. 4
Keeling did not appear in the suit and apparently he was no
longer a partner of Phenix and Wilder at the time of the suit. 5 The
81 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

516, at 163 (Wright ed.

1961); 3A MooRE, supra note 25, § 19.05[2], at 2207, and § 19.19, at 2581; and authorities
cited.
82 Cf. Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1946), 167
A.L.R. 413 (1946).
83 Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, 254 U.S. 77 (1920).
34 Miller v. Dyess, 137 Tex. 135, 151 S.2d 186 (1941); Olive-Sternenberg Lumber Co.
v. Gordon, 138 Tex. 459, 159 S.W.2d 845 (1942); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 434 (5th ed.
1925); 2 VAN FLEET, FORMER ADJUDICATION §§ 523, 524, 525, and 526 (1895).
85 The firm name appearing on the papers and briefs filed in the case is "Phenix and
Wilder"; and there is no indication in the record that Keeling participated in the
litigation.
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deeds and instruments in the case reflect that the lawyers acquired and
conveyed their interests in the property jointly as individuals and not
in the name of their partnership. Keeling was a joint owner of the
deed of trust lien from the brothers to the lawyers, and his ability to
protect that interest would be impaired as a practical matter by any
judgment setting aside the title of his deed of trust grantors and his
co-lienholders. Neither could complete relief be given between those
already parties in his absence. Snider and the brothers could not be
protected from inconsistent judgments should Keeling elect to sue to
establish and foreclose his deed of trust lien at some future date. The
consequences that a judgment rendered in his absence will as a practical matter be prejudicial to him and will decree only incomplete
relief for the others could not be avoided or lessened by the shaping
of relief between those already parties to the suit. Furthermore, Keeling could be made a party and his rights in the land could be adjudicated, although he may not be subject to personal service of process
and may refuse to voluntarily appear in person before the court.3 6
Those already parties would have had an adequate, albeit delayed,
remedy if the suit had been abated by the trial court for nonjoinder
of Keeling; even if abated by the appellate courts for fundamental
error, they would have had the remedy of a new trial properly joining
the deed of trust lienholders. The lienholders were "indispensable
parties," 37 and one of them, Keeling, was absent.
Mr. Rickard was not an indispensable party to the Snider suit. The
disputed deeds purported to convey the separate property of Mrs.
Rickard in which Mr. Rickard had no proprietary interest.88 Article
36 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "It is in virtue of the States' jurisdiction
over the property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can
inquire into that non-residents obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then
be carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If
the non-residents have no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate." And see also TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2031a and 2031b.
37 Cf. generally: Scott v. Graham, 156 Tex. 97, 292 S.W.2d 324 (1956); Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942); Shell Oil v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d
483 (1942); Sharpe v. Landowners Oil Association, 127 Tex. 147, 92 S.W.2d 434 (1936);
Knioum v. Slattery, 239 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd);
Rogers Nat'l Bank v. Pewitt, 231 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, writ
ref'd); Belt v. Texas Co., 175 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943, writ ref'd).
Cf. as to lienholders: Copus v. Middleton, 2 Madd. 410, 56 Eng. Rep. 386 (1817); Perkins,
Livingston & Post v. Brierfield Iron & Coal Co., 77 Ala. 403 (1884); R. W. Allen & Co.
v. Sands, 216 Ala. 106, 112 So. 528 (1927); Warfield v. Marks, 190 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.
1951); Keene v. Hale-Halsell Co., 118 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1941); Roos v. Texas Co., 23
F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1927); Gray v. Havemeyer, 53 F. 174 (8th Cir. 1892). See also: Dedman,
Indispensable Parties in Pooling Cases, 9 Sw. L.J. 27 (1955); Frumer, Multiple Parties
and Claims in Texas, 6 Sw. L.J. 135 (1952); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 395 (1952).
38 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4613.
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129939 was repealed and Articles 4614 and 461840 were amended by
the Legislature, effective August 23, 1963, removing all requirements
for formal joinder of the husband in his wife's conveyances of her
separate lands except homesteads. Although he did join in executing
the 1964 deed, his joinder in the execution was unnecessary except to
convey the homestead tract, one of the eleven tracts, and that was exempt from the reach of creditors and was not affected by the suit;
neither did Rickard have an heirship interest should the deeds be set
aside for the benefit of Snider. The 1964 deed effectively conveyed to
the lawyers any interest which Mrs. Rickard owned and purported to
convey which was not subject to Snider's claim or not needed to
satisfy it. The homestead tract, for example, was effectively conveyed
by the deed regardless of Snider's claim.
While title passes to the vendee [grantee] in a fraudulent conveyance, as against the debtor [grantor] and his estate, and such
vendee [grantee] would receive any excess on the value of the
property conveyed over the debts chargeable against same, nevertheless, as to defrauded creditors, the conveyance is void, and is
41
denied any effect as prejudicing the lien of the creditor.
Because Mr. Rickard would have no remaining interest in the land
regardless of the outcome of the Snider suit, he was not an indispens42
able party.
CONCLUSION

Like many legal questions, parties problems require the courts to
balance competing factors and considerations and to make preliminary
fact findings on which to base ultimate rulings whether absentees are
indispensable or even necessary to the disposition of particular suits.
Such questions are law matters, but like so many other questions of
construction and application, there is no clear division line and preliminary fact findings by the courts are required. The factors can be
enumerated; the courts' analytical method simplified; and some predictability can be molded by careful lawyering.
39 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.

40 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
4'Douglas v. First Nat'l Bank

of El Dorado, 120 Tex. 631, 40 S.W.2d 801, 802
(1931). See also: TEX. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 3997; Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381
S.W.2d 48 (rex. Sup. 1964); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Morse, 132 Tex. 534,
124 S.W.2d 330 (1939); and Ransom v. Ransom, 252 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft.
Worth 1952, writ ref'd).
42 Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1940, holding approved).
Cf. Petroleum Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Sup. 1966); and
Petroleum Producers Co. v. Reed, 135 Tex. 386, 144 S.W.2d 540 (1940).
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